xfrm: Add Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding XFRM attribute
authorMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Wed, 8 Dec 2010 04:37:49 +0000 (04:37 +0000)
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fri, 10 Dec 2010 22:43:58 +0000 (14:43 -0800)
The XFRMA_TFCPAD attribute for XFRM state installation configures
Traffic Flow Confidentiality by padding ESP packets to a specified
length.

Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
include/linux/xfrm.h
include/net/xfrm.h
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c

index b971e38..930fdd2 100644 (file)
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ enum xfrm_attr_type_t {
        XFRMA_KMADDRESS,        /* struct xfrm_user_kmaddress */
        XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC,   /* struct xfrm_algo_auth */
        XFRMA_MARK,             /* struct xfrm_mark */
+       XFRMA_TFCPAD,           /* __u32 */
        __XFRMA_MAX
 
 #define XFRMA_MAX (__XFRMA_MAX - 1)
index 7fa5b00..b9f385d 100644 (file)
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct xfrm_state {
        struct xfrm_id          id;
        struct xfrm_selector    sel;
        struct xfrm_mark        mark;
+       u32                     tfcpad;
 
        u32                     genid;
 
index 8bae6b2..8eb8895 100644 (file)
@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
                     !attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC]) ||
                    attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD]       ||
                    attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT]      ||
-                   attrs[XFRMA_ALG_COMP])
+                   attrs[XFRMA_ALG_COMP]       ||
+                   attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD])
                        goto out;
                break;
 
@@ -165,6 +166,9 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
                     attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT]) &&
                    attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD])
                        goto out;
+               if (attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD] &&
+                   p->mode != XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
+                       goto out;
                break;
 
        case IPPROTO_COMP:
@@ -172,7 +176,8 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
                    attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD]       ||
                    attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH]       ||
                    attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC] ||
-                   attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT])
+                   attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT]      ||
+                   attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD])
                        goto out;
                break;
 
@@ -186,6 +191,7 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
                    attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT]      ||
                    attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP]          ||
                    attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]        ||
+                   attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD]         ||
                    !attrs[XFRMA_COADDR])
                        goto out;
                break;
@@ -439,6 +445,9 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_construct(struct net *net,
                        goto error;
        }
 
+       if (attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD])
+               x->tfcpad = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD]);
+
        if (attrs[XFRMA_COADDR]) {
                x->coaddr = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_COADDR]),
                                    sizeof(*x->coaddr), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -688,6 +697,9 @@ static int copy_to_user_state_extra(struct xfrm_state *x,
        if (x->encap)
                NLA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ENCAP, sizeof(*x->encap), x->encap);
 
+       if (x->tfcpad)
+               NLA_PUT_U32(skb, XFRMA_TFCPAD, x->tfcpad);
+
        if (xfrm_mark_put(skb, &x->mark))
                goto nla_put_failure;
 
@@ -2122,6 +2134,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
        [XFRMA_MIGRATE]         = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_migrate) },
        [XFRMA_KMADDRESS]       = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_kmaddress) },
        [XFRMA_MARK]            = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_mark) },
+       [XFRMA_TFCPAD]          = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 };
 
 static struct xfrm_link {
@@ -2301,6 +2314,8 @@ static inline size_t xfrm_sa_len(struct xfrm_state *x)
                l += nla_total_size(sizeof(*x->calg));
        if (x->encap)
                l += nla_total_size(sizeof(*x->encap));
+       if (x->tfcpad)
+               l += nla_total_size(sizeof(x->tfcpad));
        if (x->security)
                l += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) +
                                    x->security->ctx_len);