f2fs crypto: remove checking key context during lookup

No matter what the key is valid or not, readdir shows the dir entries correctly.
So, lookup should not failed.
But, we expect further accesses should be denied from open, rename, link, and so
on.

Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
index bbd83e4..4ad7242 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
@@ -260,16 +260,6 @@ static struct dentry *f2fs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
        if (IS_ERR(inode))
                return ERR_CAST(inode);
 
-       if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(dir) && f2fs_may_encrypt(inode) &&
-               !f2fs_is_child_context_consistent_with_parent(dir, inode)) {
-               iput(inode);
-               f2fs_msg(inode->i_sb, KERN_WARNING,
-                               "Inconsistent encryption contexts: %lu/%lu\n",
-                               (unsigned long)dir->i_ino,
-                               (unsigned long)inode->i_ino);
-               return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-       }
-
        if (f2fs_has_inline_dots(inode)) {
                err = __recover_dot_dentries(inode, dir->i_ino);
                if (err)