/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008, 2009, 2010 Nicira Networks.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 Nicira, Inc.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
#include <config.h>
#include "stream-ssl.h"
#include "dhparams.h"
-#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <poll.h>
-#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include "coverage.h"
#include "dynamic-string.h"
-#include "leak-checker.h"
+#include "entropy.h"
#include "ofpbuf.h"
#include "openflow/openflow.h"
#include "packets.h"
#include "poll-loop.h"
-#include "socket-util.h"
+#include "shash.h"
#include "socket-util.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "stream-provider.h"
#include "stream.h"
+#include "timeval.h"
+#include "openvswitch/vlog.h"
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+/* Ref: https://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html#PROG2
+ * Your application must link against the same version of the Win32 C-Runtime
+ * against which your openssl libraries were linked. The default version for
+ * OpenSSL is /MD - "Multithreaded DLL". If we compile Open vSwitch with
+ * something other than /MD, instead of re-compiling OpenSSL
+ * toolkit, openssl/applink.c can be #included. Also, it is important
+ * to add CRYPTO_malloc_init prior first call to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * XXX: The behavior of the following #include when Open vSwitch is
+ * compiled with /MD is not tested. */
+#include <openssl/applink.c>
+#define SHUT_RDWR SD_BOTH
+#endif
-#include "vlog.h"
-#define THIS_MODULE VLM_stream_ssl
+VLOG_DEFINE_THIS_MODULE(stream_ssl);
/* Active SSL. */
{
struct stream stream;
enum ssl_state state;
- int connect_error;
enum session_type type;
int fd;
SSL *ssl;
struct ofpbuf *txbuf;
+ unsigned int session_nr;
/* rx_want and tx_want record the result of the last call to SSL_read()
* and SSL_write(), respectively:
* deadlock and livelock situations above.
*/
int rx_want, tx_want;
+
+ /* A few bytes of header data in case SSL negotiation fails. */
+ uint8_t head[2];
+ short int n_head;
};
/* SSL context created by ssl_init(). */
static SSL_CTX *ctx;
-/* Required configuration. */
-static bool has_private_key, has_certificate, has_ca_cert;
+struct ssl_config_file {
+ bool read; /* Whether the file was successfully read. */
+ char *file_name; /* Configured file name, if any. */
+ struct timespec mtime; /* File mtime as of last time we read it. */
+};
+
+/* SSL configuration files. */
+static struct ssl_config_file private_key;
+static struct ssl_config_file certificate;
+static struct ssl_config_file ca_cert;
+
+/* Ordinarily, the SSL client and server verify each other's certificates using
+ * a CA certificate. Setting this to false disables this behavior. (This is a
+ * security risk.) */
+static bool verify_peer_cert = true;
/* Ordinarily, we require a CA certificate for the peer to be locally
- * available. 'has_ca_cert' is true when this is the case, and neither of the
- * following variables matter.
- *
- * We can, however, bootstrap the CA certificate from the peer at the beginning
- * of our first connection then use that certificate on all subsequent
- * connections, saving it to a file for use in future runs also. In this case,
- * 'has_ca_cert' is false, 'bootstrap_ca_cert' is true, and 'ca_cert_file'
- * names the file to be saved. */
+ * available. We can, however, bootstrap the CA certificate from the peer at
+ * the beginning of our first connection then use that certificate on all
+ * subsequent connections, saving it to a file for use in future runs also. In
+ * this case, 'bootstrap_ca_cert' is true. */
static bool bootstrap_ca_cert;
-static char *ca_cert_file;
+
+/* Session number. Used in debug logging messages to uniquely identify a
+ * session. */
+static unsigned int next_session_nr;
/* Who knows what can trigger various SSL errors, so let's throttle them down
* quite a bit. */
static bool ssl_wants_io(int ssl_error);
static void ssl_close(struct stream *);
static void ssl_clear_txbuf(struct ssl_stream *);
+static void interpret_queued_ssl_error(const char *function);
static int interpret_ssl_error(const char *function, int ret, int error,
int *want);
-static DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_export UNUSED, int keylength);
+static DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_export OVS_UNUSED, int keylength);
static void log_ca_cert(const char *file_name, X509 *cert);
+static void stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(const char *file_name,
+ bool bootstrap, bool force);
+static void ssl_protocol_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *, size_t, SSL *, void *sslv_);
+static bool update_ssl_config(struct ssl_config_file *, const char *file_name);
+static int sock_errno(void);
static short int
want_to_poll_events(int want)
{
switch (want) {
case SSL_NOTHING:
- NOT_REACHED();
+ OVS_NOT_REACHED();
case SSL_READING:
return POLLIN;
return POLLOUT;
default:
- NOT_REACHED();
+ OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
static int
new_ssl_stream(const char *name, int fd, enum session_type type,
- enum ssl_state state, const struct sockaddr_in *remote,
- struct stream **streamp)
+ enum ssl_state state, struct stream **streamp)
{
- struct sockaddr_in local;
- socklen_t local_len = sizeof local;
struct ssl_stream *sslv;
SSL *ssl = NULL;
- int on = 1;
int retval;
/* Check for all the needful configuration. */
retval = 0;
- if (!has_private_key) {
+ if (!private_key.read) {
VLOG_ERR("Private key must be configured to use SSL");
retval = ENOPROTOOPT;
}
- if (!has_certificate) {
+ if (!certificate.read) {
VLOG_ERR("Certificate must be configured to use SSL");
retval = ENOPROTOOPT;
}
- if (!has_ca_cert && !bootstrap_ca_cert) {
+ if (!ca_cert.read && verify_peer_cert && !bootstrap_ca_cert) {
VLOG_ERR("CA certificate must be configured to use SSL");
retval = ENOPROTOOPT;
}
- if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+ if (!retval && !SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
VLOG_ERR("Private key does not match certificate public key: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
retval = ENOPROTOOPT;
goto error;
}
- /* Get the local IP and port information */
- retval = getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &local, &local_len);
- if (retval) {
- memset(&local, 0, sizeof local);
- }
-
- /* Disable Nagle. */
- retval = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &on, sizeof on);
- if (retval) {
- VLOG_ERR("%s: setsockopt(TCP_NODELAY): %s", name, strerror(errno));
- retval = errno;
- goto error;
+ /* Disable Nagle.
+ * On windows platforms, this can only be called upon TCP connected.
+ */
+ if (state == STATE_SSL_CONNECTING) {
+ setsockopt_tcp_nodelay(fd);
}
/* Create and configure OpenSSL stream. */
retval = ENOPROTOOPT;
goto error;
}
- if (bootstrap_ca_cert && type == CLIENT) {
+ if (!verify_peer_cert || (bootstrap_ca_cert && type == CLIENT)) {
SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
}
/* Create and return the ssl_stream. */
sslv = xmalloc(sizeof *sslv);
stream_init(&sslv->stream, &ssl_stream_class, EAGAIN, name);
- stream_set_remote_ip(&sslv->stream, remote->sin_addr.s_addr);
- stream_set_remote_port(&sslv->stream, remote->sin_port);
- stream_set_local_ip(&sslv->stream, local.sin_addr.s_addr);
- stream_set_local_port(&sslv->stream, local.sin_port);
sslv->state = state;
sslv->type = type;
sslv->fd = fd;
sslv->ssl = ssl;
sslv->txbuf = NULL;
sslv->rx_want = sslv->tx_want = SSL_NOTHING;
+ sslv->session_nr = next_session_nr++;
+ sslv->n_head = 0;
+
+ if (VLOG_IS_DBG_ENABLED()) {
+ SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, ssl_protocol_cb);
+ SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, sslv);
+ }
+
*streamp = &sslv->stream;
return 0;
if (ssl) {
SSL_free(ssl);
}
- close(fd);
+ closesocket(fd);
return retval;
}
}
static int
-ssl_open(const char *name, char *suffix, struct stream **streamp)
+ssl_open(const char *name, char *suffix, struct stream **streamp, uint8_t dscp)
{
- struct sockaddr_in sin;
int error, fd;
error = ssl_init();
return error;
}
- error = inet_open_active(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_SSL_PORT, &sin, &fd);
+ error = inet_open_active(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_PORT, NULL, &fd,
+ dscp);
if (fd >= 0) {
int state = error ? STATE_TCP_CONNECTING : STATE_SSL_CONNECTING;
- return new_ssl_stream(name, fd, CLIENT, state, &sin, streamp);
+ return new_ssl_stream(name, fd, CLIENT, state, streamp);
} else {
- VLOG_ERR("%s: connect: %s", name, strerror(error));
+ VLOG_ERR("%s: connect: %s", name, ovs_strerror(error));
return error;
}
}
{
struct ssl_stream *sslv = ssl_stream_cast(stream);
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
- X509 *ca_cert;
+ X509 *cert;
FILE *file;
int error;
int fd;
"peer");
return EPROTO;
}
- ca_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+ cert = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
- /* Check that 'ca_cert' is self-signed. Otherwise it is not a CA
+ /* Check that 'cert' is self-signed. Otherwise it is not a CA
* certificate and we should not attempt to use it as one. */
- error = X509_check_issued(ca_cert, ca_cert);
+ error = X509_check_issued(cert, cert);
if (error) {
VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: obtained certificate is "
"not self-signed (%s)",
return EPROTO;
}
- fd = open(ca_cert_file, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0444);
+ fd = open(ca_cert.file_name, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0444);
if (fd < 0) {
- VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: creating %s failed: %s",
- ca_cert_file, strerror(errno));
- return errno;
+ if (errno == EEXIST) {
+ VLOG_INFO_RL(&rl, "reading CA cert %s created by another process",
+ ca_cert.file_name);
+ stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(ca_cert.file_name, true, true);
+ return EPROTO;
+ } else {
+ VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: creating %s failed: %s",
+ ca_cert.file_name, ovs_strerror(errno));
+ return errno;
+ }
}
file = fdopen(fd, "w");
if (!file) {
- int error = errno;
+ error = errno;
VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: fdopen failed: %s",
- strerror(error));
- unlink(ca_cert_file);
+ ovs_strerror(error));
+ unlink(ca_cert.file_name);
return error;
}
- if (!PEM_write_X509(file, ca_cert)) {
+ if (!PEM_write_X509(file, cert)) {
VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: PEM_write_X509 to %s failed: "
- "%s", ca_cert_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ "%s", ca_cert.file_name,
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
fclose(file);
- unlink(ca_cert_file);
+ unlink(ca_cert.file_name);
return EIO;
}
if (fclose(file)) {
- int error = errno;
+ error = errno;
VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: writing %s failed: %s",
- ca_cert_file, strerror(error));
- unlink(ca_cert_file);
+ ca_cert.file_name, ovs_strerror(error));
+ unlink(ca_cert.file_name);
return error;
}
- VLOG_INFO("successfully bootstrapped CA cert to %s", ca_cert_file);
- log_ca_cert(ca_cert_file, ca_cert);
+ VLOG_INFO("successfully bootstrapped CA cert to %s", ca_cert.file_name);
+ log_ca_cert(ca_cert.file_name, cert);
bootstrap_ca_cert = false;
- has_ca_cert = true;
+ ca_cert.read = true;
- /* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA makes a copy of ca_cert's relevant data. */
- SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, ca_cert);
+ /* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA makes a copy of cert's relevant data. */
+ SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, cert);
- /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate() takes ownership of the certificate passed in.
- * 'ca_cert' is owned by sslv->ssl, so we need to duplicate it. */
- ca_cert = X509_dup(ca_cert);
- if (!ca_cert) {
- out_of_memory();
- }
- if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, ca_cert_file, NULL) != 1) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, X509_STORE_new());
+ if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, ca_cert.file_name, NULL) != 1) {
VLOG_ERR("SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return EPROTO;
return retval;
}
sslv->state = STATE_SSL_CONNECTING;
+ setsockopt_tcp_nodelay(sslv->fd);
/* Fall through. */
case STATE_SSL_CONNECTING:
+ /* Capture the first few bytes of received data so that we can guess
+ * what kind of funny data we've been sent if SSL negotiation fails. */
+ if (sslv->n_head <= 0) {
+ sslv->n_head = recv(sslv->fd, sslv->head, sizeof sslv->head,
+ MSG_PEEK);
+ }
+
retval = (sslv->type == CLIENT
? SSL_connect(sslv->ssl) : SSL_accept(sslv->ssl));
if (retval != 1) {
return EAGAIN;
} else {
int unused;
+
interpret_ssl_error((sslv->type == CLIENT ? "SSL_connect"
: "SSL_accept"), retval, error, &unused);
shutdown(sslv->fd, SHUT_RDWR);
+ stream_report_content(sslv->head, sslv->n_head, STREAM_SSL,
+ &this_module, stream_get_name(stream));
return EPROTO;
}
} else if (bootstrap_ca_cert) {
return do_ca_cert_bootstrap(stream);
- } else if ((SSL_get_verify_mode(sslv->ssl)
- & (SSL_VERIFY_NONE | SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
- != SSL_VERIFY_PEER) {
+ } else if (verify_peer_cert
+ && ((SSL_get_verify_mode(sslv->ssl)
+ & (SSL_VERIFY_NONE | SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
+ != SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
/* Two or more SSL connections completed at the same time while we
* were in bootstrap mode. Only one of these can finish the
* bootstrap successfully. The other one(s) must be rejected
* certificate, but that's more trouble than it's worth. These
* connections will succeed the next time they retry, assuming that
* they have a certificate against the correct CA.) */
- VLOG_ERR("rejecting SSL connection during bootstrap race window");
+ VLOG_INFO("rejecting SSL connection during bootstrap race window");
return EPROTO;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
- NOT_REACHED();
+ OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
static void
* background. */
SSL_shutdown(sslv->ssl);
+ /* SSL_shutdown() might have signaled an error, in which case we need to
+ * flush it out of the OpenSSL error queue or the next OpenSSL operation
+ * will falsely signal an error. */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
SSL_free(sslv->ssl);
- close(sslv->fd);
+ closesocket(sslv->fd);
free(sslv);
}
+static void
+interpret_queued_ssl_error(const char *function)
+{
+ int queued_error = ERR_get_error();
+ if (queued_error != 0) {
+ VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: %s",
+ function, ERR_error_string(queued_error, NULL));
+ } else {
+ VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: SSL_ERROR_SSL without queued error", function);
+ }
+}
+
static int
interpret_ssl_error(const char *function, int ret, int error,
int *want)
if (ret < 0) {
int status = errno;
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: system error (%s)",
- function, strerror(status));
+ function, ovs_strerror(status));
return status;
} else {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: unexpected SSL connection close",
}
}
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL: {
- int queued_error = ERR_get_error();
- if (queued_error != 0) {
- VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: %s",
- function, ERR_error_string(queued_error, NULL));
- } else {
- VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: SSL_ERROR_SSL without queued error",
- function);
- }
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ interpret_queued_ssl_error(function);
break;
- }
default:
VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: bad SSL error code %d", function, error);
ssize_t ret;
/* Behavior of zero-byte SSL_read is poorly defined. */
- assert(n > 0);
+ ovs_assert(n > 0);
old_state = SSL_get_state(sslv->ssl);
ret = SSL_read(sslv->ssl, buffer, n);
ssl_clear_txbuf(sslv);
return n;
case EAGAIN:
- leak_checker_claim(buffer);
return n;
default:
sslv->txbuf = NULL;
/* ssl_connect() called SSL_accept() or SSL_connect(), which
* set up the status that we test here. */
poll_fd_wait(sslv->fd,
- want_to_poll_events(SSL_want(sslv->ssl)));
+ want_to_poll_events(SSL_want(sslv->ssl)));
break;
default:
- NOT_REACHED();
+ OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
break;
break;
default:
- NOT_REACHED();
+ OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
-struct stream_class ssl_stream_class = {
+const struct stream_class ssl_stream_class = {
"ssl", /* name */
+ true, /* needs_probes */
ssl_open, /* open */
ssl_close, /* close */
ssl_connect, /* connect */
int fd;
};
-struct pstream_class pssl_pstream_class;
+const struct pstream_class pssl_pstream_class;
static struct pssl_pstream *
pssl_pstream_cast(struct pstream *pstream)
}
static int
-pssl_open(const char *name UNUSED, char *suffix, struct pstream **pstreamp)
+pssl_open(const char *name OVS_UNUSED, char *suffix, struct pstream **pstreamp,
+ uint8_t dscp)
{
+ char bound_name[SS_NTOP_BUFSIZE + 16];
+ char addrbuf[SS_NTOP_BUFSIZE];
+ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
struct pssl_pstream *pssl;
- struct sockaddr_in sin;
- char bound_name[128];
+ uint16_t port;
int retval;
int fd;
return retval;
}
- fd = inet_open_passive(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_SSL_PORT, &sin);
+ fd = inet_open_passive(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_PORT, &ss, dscp, true);
if (fd < 0) {
return -fd;
}
- sprintf(bound_name, "pssl:%"PRIu16":"IP_FMT,
- ntohs(sin.sin_port), IP_ARGS(&sin.sin_addr.s_addr));
+
+ port = ss_get_port(&ss);
+ snprintf(bound_name, sizeof bound_name, "pssl:%"PRIu16":%s",
+ port, ss_format_address(&ss, addrbuf, sizeof addrbuf));
pssl = xmalloc(sizeof *pssl);
pstream_init(&pssl->pstream, &pssl_pstream_class, bound_name);
+ pstream_set_bound_port(&pssl->pstream, htons(port));
pssl->fd = fd;
*pstreamp = &pssl->pstream;
return 0;
pssl_close(struct pstream *pstream)
{
struct pssl_pstream *pssl = pssl_pstream_cast(pstream);
- close(pssl->fd);
+ closesocket(pssl->fd);
free(pssl);
}
pssl_accept(struct pstream *pstream, struct stream **new_streamp)
{
struct pssl_pstream *pssl = pssl_pstream_cast(pstream);
- struct sockaddr_in sin;
- socklen_t sin_len = sizeof sin;
- char name[128];
+ char name[SS_NTOP_BUFSIZE + 16];
+ char addrbuf[SS_NTOP_BUFSIZE];
+ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+ socklen_t ss_len = sizeof ss;
int new_fd;
int error;
- new_fd = accept(pssl->fd, &sin, &sin_len);
+ new_fd = accept(pssl->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &ss, &ss_len);
if (new_fd < 0) {
- int error = errno;
+ error = sock_errno();
+#ifdef _WIN32
+ if (error == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) {
+ error = EAGAIN;
+ }
+#endif
if (error != EAGAIN) {
- VLOG_DBG_RL(&rl, "accept: %s", strerror(error));
+ VLOG_DBG_RL(&rl, "accept: %s", sock_strerror(error));
}
return error;
}
error = set_nonblocking(new_fd);
if (error) {
- close(new_fd);
+ closesocket(new_fd);
return error;
}
- sprintf(name, "ssl:"IP_FMT, IP_ARGS(&sin.sin_addr));
- if (sin.sin_port != htons(OFP_SSL_PORT)) {
- sprintf(strchr(name, '\0'), ":%"PRIu16, ntohs(sin.sin_port));
- }
- return new_ssl_stream(name, new_fd, SERVER, STATE_SSL_CONNECTING, &sin,
- new_streamp);
+ snprintf(name, sizeof name, "ssl:%s:%"PRIu16,
+ ss_format_address(&ss, addrbuf, sizeof addrbuf),
+ ss_get_port(&ss));
+ return new_ssl_stream(name, new_fd, SERVER, STATE_SSL_CONNECTING,
+ new_streamp);
}
static void
poll_fd_wait(pssl->fd, POLLIN);
}
-struct pstream_class pssl_pstream_class = {
+const struct pstream_class pssl_pstream_class = {
"pssl",
+ true,
pssl_open,
pssl_close,
pssl_accept,
static int init_status = -1;
if (init_status < 0) {
init_status = do_ssl_init();
- assert(init_status >= 0);
+ ovs_assert(init_status >= 0);
}
return init_status;
}
{
SSL_METHOD *method;
+#ifdef _WIN32
+ /* The following call is needed if we "#include <openssl/applink.c>". */
+ CRYPTO_malloc_init();
+#endif
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
- method = TLSv1_method();
+ if (!RAND_status()) {
+ /* We occasionally see OpenSSL fail to seed its random number generator
+ * in heavily loaded hypervisors. I suspect the following scenario:
+ *
+ * 1. OpenSSL calls read() to get 32 bytes from /dev/urandom.
+ * 2. The kernel generates 10 bytes of randomness and copies it out.
+ * 3. A signal arrives (perhaps SIGALRM).
+ * 4. The kernel interrupts the system call to service the signal.
+ * 5. Userspace gets 10 bytes of entropy.
+ * 6. OpenSSL doesn't read again to get the final 22 bytes. Therefore
+ * OpenSSL doesn't have enough entropy to consider itself
+ * initialized.
+ *
+ * The only part I'm not entirely sure about is #6, because the OpenSSL
+ * code is so hard to read. */
+ uint8_t seed[32];
+ int retval;
+
+ VLOG_WARN("OpenSSL random seeding failed, reseeding ourselves");
+
+ retval = get_entropy(seed, sizeof seed);
+ if (retval) {
+ VLOG_ERR("failed to obtain entropy (%s)",
+ ovs_retval_to_string(retval));
+ return retval > 0 ? retval : ENOPROTOOPT;
+ }
+
+ RAND_seed(seed, sizeof seed);
+ }
+
+ /* OpenSSL has a bunch of "connection methods": SSLv2_method(),
+ * SSLv3_method(), TLSv1_method(), SSLv23_method(), ... Most of these
+ * support exactly one version of SSL, e.g. TLSv1_method() supports TLSv1
+ * only, not any earlier *or later* version. The only exception is
+ * SSLv23_method(), which in fact supports *any* version of SSL and TLS.
+ * We don't want SSLv2 or SSLv3 support, so we turn it off below with
+ * SSL_CTX_set_options().
+ *
+ * The cast is needed to avoid a warning with newer versions of OpenSSL in
+ * which SSLv23_method() returns a "const" pointer. */
+ method = CONST_CAST(SSL_METHOD *, SSLv23_method());
if (method == NULL) {
VLOG_ERR("TLSv1_method: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return ENOPROTOOPT;
SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
return 0;
}
static DH *
-tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl UNUSED, int is_export UNUSED, int keylength)
+tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl OVS_UNUSED, int is_export OVS_UNUSED, int keylength)
{
struct dh {
int keylength;
if (!dh->dh) {
dh->dh = dh->constructor();
if (!dh->dh) {
- ovs_fatal(ENOMEM, "out of memory constructing "
- "Diffie-Hellman parameters");
+ out_of_memory();
}
}
return dh->dh;
/* Returns true if SSL is at least partially configured. */
bool
-stream_ssl_is_configured(void)
+stream_ssl_is_configured(void)
{
- return has_private_key || has_certificate || has_ca_cert;
+ return private_key.file_name || certificate.file_name || ca_cert.file_name;
}
-void
-stream_ssl_set_private_key_file(const char *file_name)
+static bool
+update_ssl_config(struct ssl_config_file *config, const char *file_name)
{
- if (ssl_init()) {
- return;
+ struct timespec mtime;
+ int error;
+
+ if (ssl_init() || !file_name) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* If the file name hasn't changed and neither has the file contents, stop
+ * here. */
+ error = get_mtime(file_name, &mtime);
+ if (error && error != ENOENT) {
+ VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: stat failed (%s)",
+ file_name, ovs_strerror(error));
+ }
+ if (config->file_name
+ && !strcmp(config->file_name, file_name)
+ && mtime.tv_sec == config->mtime.tv_sec
+ && mtime.tv_nsec == config->mtime.tv_nsec) {
+ return false;
}
- if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, file_name, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) {
+
+ /* Update 'config'. */
+ config->mtime = mtime;
+ if (file_name != config->file_name) {
+ free(config->file_name);
+ config->file_name = xstrdup(file_name);
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void
+stream_ssl_set_private_key_file__(const char *file_name)
+{
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, file_name, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) == 1) {
+ private_key.read = true;
+ } else {
VLOG_ERR("SSL_use_PrivateKey_file: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- return;
}
- has_private_key = true;
}
void
-stream_ssl_set_certificate_file(const char *file_name)
+stream_ssl_set_private_key_file(const char *file_name)
{
- if (ssl_init()) {
- return;
+ if (update_ssl_config(&private_key, file_name)) {
+ stream_ssl_set_private_key_file__(file_name);
}
- if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, file_name) != 1) {
+}
+
+static void
+stream_ssl_set_certificate_file__(const char *file_name)
+{
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, file_name, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) == 1) {
+ certificate.read = true;
+ } else {
VLOG_ERR("SSL_use_certificate_file: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- return;
}
- has_certificate = true;
+}
+
+void
+stream_ssl_set_certificate_file(const char *file_name)
+{
+ if (update_ssl_config(&certificate, file_name)) {
+ stream_ssl_set_certificate_file__(file_name);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Sets the private key and certificate files in one operation. Use this
+ * interface, instead of calling stream_ssl_set_private_key_file() and
+ * stream_ssl_set_certificate_file() individually, in the main loop of a
+ * long-running program whose key and certificate might change at runtime.
+ *
+ * This is important because of OpenSSL's behavior. If an OpenSSL context
+ * already has a certificate, and stream_ssl_set_private_key_file() is called
+ * to install a new private key, OpenSSL will report an error because the new
+ * private key does not match the old certificate. The other order, of setting
+ * a new certificate, then setting a new private key, does work.
+ *
+ * If this were the only problem, calling stream_ssl_set_certificate_file()
+ * before stream_ssl_set_private_key_file() would fix it. But, if the private
+ * key is changed before the certificate (e.g. someone "scp"s or "mv"s the new
+ * private key in place before the certificate), then OpenSSL would reject that
+ * change, and then the change of certificate would succeed, but there would be
+ * no associated private key (because it had only changed once and therefore
+ * there was no point in re-reading it).
+ *
+ * This function avoids both problems by, whenever either the certificate or
+ * the private key file changes, re-reading both of them, in the correct order.
+ */
+void
+stream_ssl_set_key_and_cert(const char *private_key_file,
+ const char *certificate_file)
+{
+ if (update_ssl_config(&private_key, private_key_file)
+ || update_ssl_config(&certificate, certificate_file)) {
+ stream_ssl_set_certificate_file__(certificate_file);
+ stream_ssl_set_private_key_file__(private_key_file);
+ }
}
/* Reads the X509 certificate or certificates in file 'file_name'. On success,
file = fopen(file_name, "r");
if (!file) {
VLOG_ERR("failed to open %s for reading: %s",
- file_name, strerror(errno));
+ file_name, ovs_strerror(errno));
return errno;
}
free(*certs);
*certs = NULL;
*n_certs = 0;
+ fclose(file);
return EIO;
}
if (i) {
ds_put_char(&fp, ':');
}
- ds_put_format(&fp, "%02hhx", digest[i]);
+ ds_put_format(&fp, "%02x", digest[i]);
}
}
subject = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0);
VLOG_INFO("Trusting CA cert from %s (%s) (fingerprint %s)", file_name,
subject ? subject : "<out of memory>", ds_cstr(&fp));
- free(subject);
+ OPENSSL_free(subject);
ds_destroy(&fp);
}
+static void
+stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(const char *file_name,
+ bool bootstrap, bool force)
+{
+ struct stat s;
+
+ if (!update_ssl_config(&ca_cert, file_name) && !force) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(file_name, "none")) {
+ verify_peer_cert = false;
+ VLOG_WARN("Peer certificate validation disabled "
+ "(this is a security risk)");
+ } else if (bootstrap && stat(file_name, &s) && errno == ENOENT) {
+ bootstrap_ca_cert = true;
+ } else {
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cert_names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(file_name);
+ if (cert_names) {
+ /* Set up list of CAs that the server will accept from the
+ * client. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, cert_names);
+
+ /* Set up CAs for OpenSSL to trust in verifying the peer's
+ * certificate. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, X509_STORE_new());
+ if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, file_name, NULL) != 1) {
+ VLOG_ERR("SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return;
+ }
+ bootstrap_ca_cert = false;
+ } else {
+ VLOG_ERR("failed to load client certificates from %s: %s",
+ file_name, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ }
+ }
+ ca_cert.read = true;
+}
+
/* Sets 'file_name' as the name of the file from which to read the CA
* certificate used to verify the peer within SSL connections. If 'bootstrap'
* is false, the file must exist. If 'bootstrap' is false, then the file is
void
stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap)
{
- X509 **certs;
- size_t n_certs;
- struct stat s;
+ stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(file_name, bootstrap, false);
+}
+\f
+/* SSL protocol logging. */
- if (ssl_init()) {
- return;
+static const char *
+ssl_alert_level_to_string(uint8_t type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case 1: return "warning";
+ case 2: return "fatal";
+ default: return "<unknown>";
}
+}
- if (bootstrap && stat(file_name, &s) && errno == ENOENT) {
- bootstrap_ca_cert = true;
- ca_cert_file = xstrdup(file_name);
- } else if (!read_cert_file(file_name, &certs, &n_certs)) {
- size_t i;
+static const char *
+ssl_alert_description_to_string(uint8_t type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case 0: return "close_notify";
+ case 10: return "unexpected_message";
+ case 20: return "bad_record_mac";
+ case 21: return "decryption_failed";
+ case 22: return "record_overflow";
+ case 30: return "decompression_failure";
+ case 40: return "handshake_failure";
+ case 42: return "bad_certificate";
+ case 43: return "unsupported_certificate";
+ case 44: return "certificate_revoked";
+ case 45: return "certificate_expired";
+ case 46: return "certificate_unknown";
+ case 47: return "illegal_parameter";
+ case 48: return "unknown_ca";
+ case 49: return "access_denied";
+ case 50: return "decode_error";
+ case 51: return "decrypt_error";
+ case 60: return "export_restriction";
+ case 70: return "protocol_version";
+ case 71: return "insufficient_security";
+ case 80: return "internal_error";
+ case 90: return "user_canceled";
+ case 100: return "no_renegotiation";
+ default: return "<unknown>";
+ }
+}
- /* Set up list of CAs that the server will accept from the client. */
- for (i = 0; i < n_certs; i++) {
- /* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA makes a copy of the relevant data. */
- if (SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, certs[i]) != 1) {
- VLOG_ERR("failed to add client certificate %d from %s: %s",
- i, file_name,
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- } else {
- log_ca_cert(file_name, certs[i]);
- }
- X509_free(certs[i]);
- }
- free(certs);
+static const char *
+ssl_handshake_type_to_string(uint8_t type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case 0: return "hello_request";
+ case 1: return "client_hello";
+ case 2: return "server_hello";
+ case 11: return "certificate";
+ case 12: return "server_key_exchange";
+ case 13: return "certificate_request";
+ case 14: return "server_hello_done";
+ case 15: return "certificate_verify";
+ case 16: return "client_key_exchange";
+ case 20: return "finished";
+ default: return "<unknown>";
+ }
+}
- /* Set up CAs for OpenSSL to trust in verifying the peer's
- * certificate. */
- if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, file_name, NULL) != 1) {
- VLOG_ERR("SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations: %s",
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- return;
- }
+static void
+ssl_protocol_cb(int write_p, int version OVS_UNUSED, int content_type,
+ const void *buf_, size_t len, SSL *ssl OVS_UNUSED, void *sslv_)
+{
+ const struct ssl_stream *sslv = sslv_;
+ const uint8_t *buf = buf_;
+ struct ds details;
+
+ if (!VLOG_IS_DBG_ENABLED()) {
+ return;
+ }
- has_ca_cert = true;
+ ds_init(&details);
+ if (content_type == 20) {
+ ds_put_cstr(&details, "change_cipher_spec");
+ } else if (content_type == 21) {
+ ds_put_format(&details, "alert: %s, %s",
+ ssl_alert_level_to_string(buf[0]),
+ ssl_alert_description_to_string(buf[1]));
+ } else if (content_type == 22) {
+ ds_put_format(&details, "handshake: %s",
+ ssl_handshake_type_to_string(buf[0]));
+ } else {
+ ds_put_format(&details, "type %d", content_type);
}
+
+ VLOG_DBG("%s%u%s%s %s (%"PRIuSIZE" bytes)",
+ sslv->type == CLIENT ? "client" : "server",
+ sslv->session_nr, write_p ? "-->" : "<--",
+ stream_get_name(&sslv->stream), ds_cstr(&details), len);
+
+ ds_destroy(&details);
}
projects / cascardo / ovs.git / blobdiff