net: avoid sk_forward_alloc overflows

A malicious TCP receiver, sending SACK, can force the sender to split
skbs in write queue and increase its memory usage.

Then, when socket is closed and its write queue purged, we might
overflow sk_forward_alloc (It becomes negative)

sk_mem_reclaim() does nothing in this case, and more than 2GB
are leaked from TCP perspective (tcp_memory_allocated is not changed)

Then warnings trigger from inet_sock_destruct() and
sk_stream_kill_queues() seeing a not zero sk_forward_alloc

All TCP stack can be stuck because TCP is under memory pressure.

A simple fix is to preemptively reclaim from sk_mem_uncharge().

This makes sure a socket wont have more than 2 MB forward allocated,
after burst and idle period.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index ff5be7e..8741988 100644 (file)
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -1332,6 +1332,16 @@ static inline void sk_mem_uncharge(struct sock *sk, int size)
        if (!sk_has_account(sk))
                return;
        sk->sk_forward_alloc += size;
+
+       /* Avoid a possible overflow.
+        * TCP send queues can make this happen, if sk_mem_reclaim()
+        * is not called and more than 2 GBytes are released at once.
+        *
+        * If we reach 2 MBytes, reclaim 1 MBytes right now, there is
+        * no need to hold that much forward allocation anyway.
+        */
+       if (unlikely(sk->sk_forward_alloc >= 1 << 21))
+               __sk_mem_reclaim(sk, 1 << 20);
 }
 
 static inline void sk_wmem_free_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)